The Supreme Court is considering whether Palestine Action should have been banned. But the case raises a question that goes beyond the law of terrorism: when does political opposition to Israel become intimidation of Jews in Britain?
A fundamental test of a free society is whether it protects the rights of people with whom the majority disagrees.
That includes the right to protest against Israel. It includes the right to advocate Palestinian self-determination, to oppose Zionism and to campaign for changes in British foreign policy.
Those rights matter. They must be defended even when the views expressed are deeply uncomfortable to others.
But there is another principle, equally fundamental, which seems increasingly neglected in our national conversation.
The right to protest against a political belief does not confer the right to intimidate those who hold it.
This distinction sits at the heart of the Supreme Court proceedings concerning the proscription of Palestine Action.
The case has attracted considerable attention, understandably. More than 4,000 arrests have been recorded at demonstrations involving signs supporting the organisation. Lawyers challenging the ban argue that the government has used an exceptional counter-terrorism power disproportionately, criminalising expressions of political support when ordinary criminal law could address unlawful conduct.
The figures deserve scrutiny. According to arguments presented to the Court, only three of 385 Palestine Action incidents assessed by the Home Secretary were considered to meet the statutory definition of terrorism.
That is a serious argument about the limits of state power.
But the number of incidents alone cannot settle the question. Their severity, the nature of the organisation's activities and the availability of less restrictive measures also matter.
So do the rights of those affected by those activities.
The Community Security Trust (CST) and Jewish Leadership Council (JLC) have intervened in the proceedings to draw attention to an aspect of Palestine Action's conduct that has received far less attention than the arrests outside the Supreme Court.
Their submission argues that the organisation's activities expanded beyond Israeli defence manufacturers to include Jewish communal institutions, Jewish-owned businesses and symbols of Jewish and Zionist history.
Among the incidents described are attacks on Jewish charities in Hendon, a Jewish-owned business in Stamford Hill and busts of Chaim Weizmann, Israel's first president.
These are matters advanced in the organisations' legal submission, not findings made by the Supreme Court. The evidence and its interpretation are contested.
Nevertheless, the questions they raise cannot simply be dismissed.
Consider the Stamford Hill incident.
According to the submission, Palestine Action justified targeting a Jewish-owned business through a chain of commercial connections ultimately leading to a business park where an Elbit subsidiary operated.
If that is sufficient to make a business a target, how remote can a connection to Israel become before the justification loses any reasonable meaning?
And why should a Jewish business in Britain bear the consequences of decisions made by an Israeli defence company?
The issue is not whether Israel should be criticised. Of course it should, where criticism is warranted.
It is whether a political grievance against Israel can be extended so broadly that Jewish institutions and businesses in Britain become acceptable targets.
There is a dangerous logic at work when association is treated as complicity and complicity becomes a justification for intimidation.
History has repeatedly shown how easily that reasoning can be used against minorities.
The distinction between motive and impact
One of the most revealing arguments reported by the BBC came from Jewish Bloc, an organisation opposing Palestine Action's proscription.
Its lawyers disputed the suggestion that Palestine Action had targeted the Jewish community, arguing that the relevant organisations and institutions were selected because of their links to Israeli activities against Palestinians.
That distinction deserves examination.
An activist may genuinely believe that an organisation is being targeted because of its political or commercial associations rather than its Jewish identity.
But the activist's stated motive does not, by itself, determine whether the conduct is antisemitic or intimidating.
Nor does a connection to Israel remove an institution's right to protection.
A Jewish charity does not cease to be a Jewish charity because it supports Israel. A Jewish business does not lose its rights because its owner is a Zionist. A synagogue does not become a legitimate target for intimidation because its congregation has connections with the Jewish state.
The law must examine the facts of each incident, including the nature of the conduct, the evidence of motive and its consequences.
What it cannot reasonably do is assume that describing a target as Zionist resolves every question about antisemitism.
That is particularly important because Zionism is not some marginal political enthusiasm within British Jewish life.
Campaign Against Antisemitism's polling found that 80% of British Jews identify as Zionists. Only 6% said they do not.
That does not make Zionism immune from criticism. Nor does it mean every act directed against a Zionist organisation is antisemitic.
It does mean that an approach to political activism which treats Zionist associations as sufficient grounds for targeting institutions has potentially profound implications for mainstream Jewish communal life.
CST and JLC express the danger in one sentence:
“If Jews need to demonstrate their anti-Zionist credentials to ensure they are safe from attack, it is a dangerous place to be.”
I think that sentence deserves considerably more attention than it has received.
Jews should not have to pass a political test
There is an increasingly familiar expectation in parts of British public life that Jews should explain their relationship with Israel before their concerns about antisemitism are taken seriously.
Are you a Zionist?
Do you support the Israeli government?
Have you condemned the war?
Have you distanced yourself from the actions of Israel sufficiently?
The questions themselves are not always illegitimate. Political beliefs can be challenged and governments should be held accountable.
But there is something deeply troubling about the suggestion that the answers determine whether Jewish people and institutions deserve protection from intimidation.
I am a British Jew and a Zionist.
My family's connection to Zionism extends back generations, through Betar and the Haganah. For us, Zionism was never a claim of superiority over another people. It was a response to a history in which Jews had repeatedly discovered the consequences of being unable to determine their own future.
I do not expect everybody to share that understanding.
Palestinians have their own history, including displacement, loss and profound suffering. Their experiences deserve to be heard and their rights respected.
I can recognise those experiences without abandoning my belief in Jewish self-determination.
I can criticise an Israeli government without accepting collective responsibility for its decisions.
And I should not have to establish any of those positions before the law takes seriously a threat against me or an institution to which I belong.
That principle should not be controversial.
We rightly reject the suggestion that British Muslims should answer for the conduct of foreign governments or extremist organisations.
We should be equally clear that British Jews are not responsible for the actions of the Israeli state.
Yet too often, the distinction disappears when the institution being targeted is described as Zionist.
Who speaks for British Jews?
Jewish Bloc also challenged the standing of CST and JLC, arguing that neither organisation has a democratic mandate to speak for British Jews.
It is true that Jewish opinion is diverse. There are Zionist Jews, anti-Zionist Jews and Jews whose relationship with Israel cannot easily be reduced to either description.
No organisation speaks for every Jew.
But the absence of a universal mandate does not invalidate evidence.
CST has extensive experience protecting Jewish schools, synagogues and communal institutions. Its knowledge of security threats and their effects is relevant to a court considering the consequences of an organisation's conduct.
That evidence should be tested, as all evidence should be. It should not be dismissed because other Jews disagree with its interpretation.
The existence of Jewish supporters of Palestine Action does not mean that other Jews cannot reasonably experience its activities as threatening.
A minority community does not have to speak with one voice before its members are entitled to protection.
Indeed, the principle of equal rights exists precisely because individuals and communities are not required to demonstrate unanimous agreement before the law recognises their interests.
The political consequences extend beyond this case
There is a wider context that makes the Supreme Court proceedings especially significant.
The Green Party recently adopted a motion declaring Zionism racist and committing itself to explicit opposition to Zionism. The same motion called for Palestine Action to be removed from the list of proscribed organisations.
Those are political positions. They do not establish that the Green Party endorses violence or intimidation, and it would be wrong to suggest otherwise.
But they illustrate how thoroughly Zionism is being recast in parts of British political discourse as an ideology whose adherents are presumed morally suspect.
That matters when most British Jews identify as Zionists.
It matters when Jewish institutions maintain entirely lawful connections with Israel.
And it matters when activists begin to treat those connections as evidence of complicity.
There must be a clear boundary between opposing an ideology and intimidating the people who subscribe to it.
A democratic society cannot allow that boundary to depend on whether the ideology in question is fashionable or unpopular.
Nor should the protection of a minority become conditional upon that minority adopting the political beliefs preferred by its critics.
What the Supreme Court must decide
The legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the proscription of Palestine Action was lawful and proportionate.
It is not a referendum on Zionism, the Israeli government or the legitimacy of Palestinian political aspirations.
The Court must examine the statutory definition of terrorism, the nature and seriousness of the conduct relied upon, the impact of proscription on expression and association and whether less restrictive measures could adequately address the risks.
Those are demanding questions, as they should be.
A state that can criminalise political support for an organisation must be required to justify that power rigorously.
But the proportionality assessment must also consider the rights and security of those affected by the organisation's conduct.
The freedom to protest is not the only freedom at stake.
There is also the freedom of British Jews to participate openly in communal life, to associate with Jewish organisations, to express their connection with Israel and to do so without fear of intimidation.
Those freedoms do not disappear because the people exercising them are Zionists.
Whatever the Supreme Court decides, that principle should remain beyond dispute.
I do not know whether the Court will uphold the ban. Nor do I believe that every act of vandalism, however objectionable, should automatically be treated as terrorism.
But I am concerned by the ease with which the targeting of Jewish institutions can be explained away once the word Zionist enters the conversation.
A connection to Israel may explain why an activist selected a particular target. It does not establish that the conduct was lawful, proportionate or free from antisemitism.
And it certainly does not remove the rights of the people affected.
The test of a society's commitment to freedom is not how generously it protects those with whom it agrees. It is whether it extends the same protection to those whose beliefs it finds objectionable.
British Jews should not have to choose between being openly Zionist and being safe.
That is not a special privilege we are asking for.
It is the ordinary protection of the law.
And it should never have been in doubt.
Sources: BBC News, Palestine Action ban undermined confidence in anti-terror laws, Supreme Court told, 5 November 2026; CST and JLC written submission in Ammori v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Campaign Against Antisemitism polling.